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A Standardless Standard
HOW A MISAPPLICATION OF KELO ENABLED
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY TO BENEFIT FROM
EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the New York Court of Appeals in Kaur v. New
York State Urban Development Corp. granted Empire State
Development Corporation (ESDC), a public authority, permission
to take land in Manhattanville by eminent domain for sale to
Columbia University, a private institution.1 The taking indirectly
displaced thousands of vulnerable residents and failed to create
meaningful public benefits.2 Though ESDC justified the taking as
a means to eliminate urban blight,3 substantial evidence strongly
indicated that its primary motivation was Columbia’s private
benefit.4 By deferring to ESDC’s findings, the court misapplied
important judicial principles and failed to prevent an
unconstitutional exercise of eminent domain.
The government’s power to take property for public use
is both created and limited by the Public Use Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which dictates that “private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”5 Since
the founding of the United States, courts have interpreted the
requirement that property only be taken to serve public
purposes as a necessary restriction on the power of legislatures
to seize land.6 By restricting the government’s authority to take
private property only for public purposes, the clause imposes a
safeguard against governmental favoritism and the abusive

1

Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010),
cert. denied Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
2
Brief of Amicus Curiae New York State Senator Bill Perkins at 19-20,
Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 2010-1025),
2010 WL 3952034, at *19-20 [hereinafter Perkins Amicus Brief].
3
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724.
4
See infra Part V.
5
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
6
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
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dispossession of property owners.7 Because takings often
disproportionately harm vulnerable populations⎯such as the
elderly and ethnic minorities⎯courts must ensure that such
power is in fact used only to further the public good.8 Failing to
do so in Kaur, the court approved an unconstitutional taking9
with devastating effects on many Manhattanville residents.10
The Supreme Court established the standard for publicuse review in Kelo v. City of New London. In Kelo, the Court
upheld a taking where the City intended to transfer property to a
private developer with the public purpose of encouraging
economic development.11 In so holding, the Court explicitly
established the government’s ability to take private property and
subsequently convey such property to another private party so
long as a predominantly public purpose is served.12 Nevertheless,
the Kelo Court maintained the judiciary’s traditional
responsibility to review whether a taking is actually intended to
serve a public purpose rather than solely to provide a private
benefit.13 The Court suggested the existence of a taking where the
evidence of hidden impermissible favoritism is so substantial as to
warrant a presumption of constitutional invalidity.14 Such a case
requires heightened judicial scrutiny into whether the taking is
actually intended to accomplish a public purpose rather than the
traditional deference applied in Kelo.15
This note argues that where affected landowners present
sufficient evidence that the purported public purpose of a taking
is merely pretextual to bestowing a private advantage, courts
must consider all such evidence and deny absolute deference to
the condemning authority.16 This way, courts can prevent
governmental agencies from abusing their power of eminent
domain to transfer property from vulnerable populations to
private parties who enjoy governmental favoritism.17

7

See, e.g., Vill. Auto Body Work, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Westbury, 454 N.Y.S.2d
741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
8
See infra Part I.
9
See infra Part V.
10
See infra Part I.
11
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
12
See id.
13
Id. at 478.
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Part II.
16
See infra Part II.
17
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 505
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).

2012]

A STANDARDLESS STANDARD

1219

Since Kelo, courts have disagreed over whether the
requirement of serious judicial inquiry into substantiated
allegations of pretext extends to takings justified by blight
remediation.18 While some courts correctly extend the Kelo
analysis to any takings challenged with substantial evidence of
impermissible favoritism,19 the Second Circuit explicitly rejected
the application of heightened scrutiny in Goldstein v. Pataki,
where a taking was intended to remediate blight because the
court found that Kelo’s pretext analysis only applied to economic
development takings.20 However, though findings of blight were
traditionally limited to unsafe and unsanitary conditions,21 the
modern definition of blight removal applied in New York is so
broad that it encompasses the spirit of economic development
addressed by the Court in Kelo.22 Therefore, the Second Circuit’s
absolute deference to the condemning authority’s findings of
blight in Goldstein failed to properly apply Kelo and invited
future abuses of the eminent domain power.23
This failing led the New York Court of Appeals in Kaur
to review the exercise of eminent domain with absolute
deference where ESDC claimed its actions were intended to
eliminate blight.24 Substantial evidence indicated the taking
was primarily intended to benefit Columbia: Columbia created
blighting factors, ESDC assisted in manufacturing a blight
study at Columbia’s behest, and ESDC sought to withhold
important documents from the challengers during litigation,
clearly indicating a conspiratorial relationship between ESDC
and Columbia.25 Furthermore, the procedural protections for
property owners seeking to bring public use challenges in New
York are prone to abuse because the statutes governing eminent
domain procedure do not allow trial-level review of such claims.26
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the taking
18

See infra Part III.
Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 170-71 (D.C.
2007) (finding impermissible favoritism where an agency gave taken land to a private
party for the purpose of developing a purportedly blighted area); In re Condemnation
Proceeding by the Redevelopment Auth. of Phila., 938 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. 2007) (citing
Kennedy’s concurrence for the requirement to seriously review the record for
impermissible favoritism).
20
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008).
21
Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y. 1975).
22
See infra Part IV.
23
See infra Part III.
24
See generally Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
25
See infra Part IV.
26
See N.Y. EM. DOM. LAW § 207 (Consol. 2011).
19
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without even mentioning the heightened standard required by
Kelo.27 By failing to apply heightened scrutiny, the court
misapplied Kelo and enabled ESDC to abuse the power of
eminent domain. Thus, the Supreme Court should have reversed
the New York Court of Appeals and remanded Kaur for review
using the heightened scrutiny required by Kelo. In denying the
challengers’ petition for certiorari,28 the Court failed to defend
the vulnerable populations who will be harmed by eminent
domain abuse in Manhattanville29 and also missed an
opportunity to clarify its misunderstood holding in Kelo.30
This note will argue that the New York Court of
Appeals applied an overly deferential standard of review to the
taking at issue in Kaur and, in doing so, disobeyed the
constitutional requirements of the Fifth Amendment under
Kelo to the detriment of Manhattanville’s economically
disadvantaged citizens. Part I will describe the harms imposed
on vulnerable populations when courts permit eminent domain
abuse. Part II will explain that Kelo requires a heightened
standard of judicial review where challengers to a taking must
present substantial evidence that a condemning authority’s
stated public purpose is mere pretext for bestowing a private
benefit. Part III will discuss the divergent standards of review
applied by courts to public use challenges where takings are
not solely justified by the need for economic development. Part
IV will argue that courts in New York should apply heightened
scrutiny to takings for blight remediation where challengers
allege an unconstitutional private purpose because the factors
in New York for determining whether an area is blighted and
those for determining the need for economic development are
indistinguishable from one another. Part V will argue that the
New York Court of Appeals failed to prevent eminent domain
abuse in Kaur. This part will argue that the court should have
applied heightened scrutiny to ESDC’s motives because
substantial factual evidence supported a finding of
impermissible favoritism and because the procedures for
challenging a taking under the Public Use Clause in New York
are particularly prone to abuse. It will further suggest that,
due to the failures of the New York judiciary to prevent
eminent domain abuse, the state legislature should take action
27
28
29
30

See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 737.
Tuck-It-Away, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 822-23.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.
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to protect vulnerable parties from private takings with merely
pretextual public benefits. Finally, this note concludes by
suggesting further discussion.
I.

THE NEED FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF SUSPICIOUS
TAKINGS TO PREVENT HARMFUL ABUSE

The government’s power to take private property has
the dangerous potential to harm vulnerable populations and
thus must be restricted to its constitutional limitations. The
Public Use Clause forbids the exercise of eminent domain for
purely
private
transfers,
which
could
otherwise
unconstitutionally harm property owners who do not enjoy
governmental favoritism.31 Without proper restraints on
legislative power to take and transfer property, “[t]he specter of
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent
the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”32 Thus,
eminent domain abuse results in legislatures favoring rich and
powerful citizens over those with less means to promote their
economic and political interests,33 just as the residents of
Harlem were harmed in favor of Columbia University.
Takings for economic development “disproportionately
harm racial and ethnic minorities, the elderly, and the
economically underprivileged.”34 This proposition, championed
by Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo,35 is supported by
substantial anecdotal evidence.36 As of 2007, eminent domain
project areas nationally were composed of, on average, 58
percent of minority residents while the surrounding
31

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting id. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
32
Id. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
33
See id. at 505.
34
Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, et. al. in Support of Petitioners at 3, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057, at *3 [hereinafter NAACP Amicus Brief].
35
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36
See NAACP Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 10 (“In San Jose, California,
ninety-five percent of the properties targeted for economic redevelopment are Hispanic
or Asian-owned, even though only thirty percent of businesses are owned by
minorities . . . . In Ventnor, New Jersey, forty percent of the city’s Latino community
lives in a zone targeted for economic redevelopment . . . . In Mt. Holly Township, New
Jersey, officials have targeted for economic redevelopment a neighborhood in which the
percentage of African-American residents (44%) is twice that of the entire Township
and nearly triple that of Burlington County, and in which the percentage of Hispanic
residents (22%) is more than double that of all of Mt. Holly Township, and more than
five times that of the county.”).
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communities contained an average of only 45 percent of
minorities.37 Similarly, the median incomes of persons living
within eminent domain project areas was $18,935.71, while the
median income of persons in the surrounding communities was
$23,113.46.38 Generally, properties are often selected for eminent
domain partially due to their low market values, which dictates
the amount of compensation the government is required to pay
upon condemnation.39 Thus, displaced citizens typically face
difficulties finding “adequate replacement housing.”40 This is
particularly burdensome on the elderly, many of whom do not
own their homes and are more likely to spend the end of their
lives in nursing homes if displaced.41 Clearly, those harmed by
takings for economic development and blight remediation are
groups with relatively little political and economic power who
are in the greatest need of protection by the courts.42
The exercise of eminent domain in Manhattanville will
primarily harm economically disadvantaged residents.43 In an
amicus brief in support of the challengers in Kaur, New York
State Senator Bill Perkins urged against the taking because
the proposed development would indirectly displace between
three thousand and five thousand Harlem residents.44 In
particular, as the affected area was composed of 29.4 percent
African-Americans and 52.3 percent Latinos, the taking would
disproportionately burden minority citizens.45 Like the takings
before it,46 the use of eminent domain in Manhattanville will
invariably impose hardships on economically disadvantaged
and politically impotent residents while further enriching a
wealthy and powerful private actor, here Columbia University.
Standing up to legislative abuse on behalf of powerless
citizens is an essential function of the courts and should be
embraced under the Public Use Clause.47 Justice Stone’s famous
Footnote Four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
37

DICK M. CARPENTER II & JOHN K. ROSS, INST. FOR JUSTICE, VICTIMIZING
VULNERABLE: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 6 (2007), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/Office_Initiatives/Eminent_Domain/Demog
raphics%20of%20Eminent%20Domain%20Abuse.pdf.
38
Id.
39
NAACP Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 13.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 14.
42
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43
Perkins Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
44
Id. at 19.
45
Id. at 19-20.
46
CARPENTER II & ROSS, supra note 37, at 6.
47
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
THE
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established the need for heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative decisions when they harm “discrete and insular
minorities.”48 Eminent domain abuse tends to cause such harm
because it “eliminates (or severely undermines) established
community support mechanisms and has a deleterious effect on
those groups’ ability to exercise what little political power they
may have established as a community.”49 Thus, takings that
benefit private parties should not receive deferential treatment
when challenged under the Public Use Clause because they
“curtail the operations of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities . . . .”50 For these reasons,
courts should apply Kelo’s test for impermissible favoritism to
takings where evidence suggests that a stated public purpose is
mere pretext for the unconstitutional transfer of property to a
private party.51 The New York Court of Appeals failed to do so
in Kaur and thus unconstitutionally harmed the vulnerable
residents of Manhattanville.52
II.

KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON: SETTING THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court established the standard for
reviewing challenges to eminent domain takings under the
Public Use Clause in Kelo.53 Where substantial evidence shows
a taking “is intended to favor a particular private party, with
only incidental or pretextual public benefits,” the court must
not defer to the condemning authority.54 Rather, the court must
review the evidence to determine if the taking will result in
actual benefits to the public.55 If such review reveals
impermissible favoritism rather than a valid public use, then
the taking is unconstitutional.56 In Kaur, the court misapplied
this standard and, in doing so, ratified a flagrant violation of
the Public Use Clause.57
In Kelo, the New London Development Corporation
(NLDC), a nonprofit entity authorized to assist the City of New
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
NAACP Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 15.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part V.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
See id. at 491-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id.
See id. at 491.
See infra Part V.
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London, sought to take private land for the purpose of
promoting economic development.58 NLDC planned to give the
land to the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer Inc. so they could build
a $300 million research facility.59 The City projected the project
would create over one thousand jobs, increase tax revenues,
and generally improve the area’s economy.60 Susette Kelo, a
homeowner whose property was at risk from the proposed
project, filed a suit against the City for violating the Public Use
Clause.61 Justice Stevens, writing for the five-justice majority,
rejected the petitioner’s claim and held that private transfers of
land taken through eminent domain are constitutional under
the Public Use Clause where the purpose is to promote
economic development.62
Though the Court gave deference to the legislature’s
determination that the public purpose of economic development
would be served by the taking,63 Justice Stevens noted that the
government may not “take property under the mere pretext of a
public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a
private benefit.”64 Such was not the case in Kelo, Stevens noted,
because the taking was “executed pursuant to a ‘carefully
considered’ development plan.”65 Thus, the Court left the door
open for a hypothetical taking that might be found
unconstitutional due to a stated public purpose that is “mere
pretext” for enriching a private party.66 However, in applying
Kelo, subsequent courts have experienced difficulty applying
this restriction because “the Kelo majority did not define the
term ‘mere pretext.’”67
Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence that qualified his
agreement with the majority in Kelo, took steps to outline a
hypothetical taking that would be unconstitutional under the
Public Use Clause for “mere pretext.”68 He defined as
unconstitutional “transfers intended to confer benefits on
particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
Id.
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 486-87.
Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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pretextual public benefits.”69 Though he agreed with Justice
Stevens that generally courts should afford legislatures
deference in their determinations to take land for public
purposes, he noted that “[a] court confronted with a plausible
accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties
should treat the objection as a serious one and review the
record to see if it has merit.”70 While the majority opinion
approached the stated public purpose with a “presumption of
validity,” Justice Kennedy put forth a hypothetical where the
risk of hidden impermissible favoritism in a transfer of taken
land to private parties is so severe that courts should instead
apply a presumption of constitutional invalidity.71 Such a case
would exist where “the transfers are . . . suspicious, or the
procedures employed . . . [are] prone to abuse, or the purported
benefits [to the public] are . . . trivial or implausible . . . .”72
Thus, Kennedy’s concurrence sets forth guidelines by which a
successful claim of pretext for impermissible favoritism can be
brought to prevent a taking that benefits a private party.73
In joining the majority to uphold the taking in Kelo,
Justice Kennedy identified several reasons why the taking at
issue did not exhibit signs of impermissible favoritism.74 Among
these factors were the City’s formulation of a development plan
and commitment of public funds for the project before the
private beneficiaries were identified.75 In addition, the City’s
compliance with “elaborate procedural requirements that
facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s
purposes” led Kennedy to join the majority in upholding the
taking as constitutional.76 Notably, such procedural safeguards
included a seven-day trial before the superior court with regard
to the public use challenge.77 As indicated in his concurrence,
the absence of such factors would have prompted Justice
Kennedy to apply a heightened level of scrutiny, which could
have resulted in a finding that the taking was an
unconstitutional violation of the Public Use Clause.78

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491-93.
Id.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 475 (majority opinion).
Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is essential to clarifying
the Kelo decision with regard to “mere pretext” because, as the
deciding vote on a split court, Kennedy explicitly conditioned his
agreement with the majority on specific actions taken by the
City’s planning process to convince him of the taking’s
constitutionality.79 Though the concurrence expresses the opinion
of only a single justice, it makes clear, in conjunction with the
majority’s warning about pretextual takings,80 that courts must
not apply an absolutely deferential standard when property
owners raise legitimate and well-founded public use challenges.81
Rather, “deference to the government’s public purpose
determination may be overcome . . . if the party challenging the
taking makes a ‘clear showing’ that the government’s stated
public purpose is ‘irrational,’ with ‘only incidental or pretextual
public benefits.’”82 Thus, courts should give close review to
takings that clearly exhibit the possibility of unconstitutional
transfers as described in Kennedy’s concurring opinion.83 As
such, Kelo establishes a “federal baseline”84 under which courts
must apply a heightened standard of review85 to challenges
under the Public Use Clause that are supported by substantial
evidence of impermissible favoritism.86
Takings that benefit private parties while only creating
incidental public benefits are unconstitutional under the Public
Use Clause.87 Thus, where substantial evidence indicates that
eminent domain is exercised with impermissible favoritism,
courts must apply a heightened standard of review to prevent
violations of the Fifth Amendment.88 By failing to apply this
scrutiny in Kaur, the New York Court of Appeals did not meet
its constitutional obligation to prevent a taking justified by
merely pretextual benefits to the public.89

79

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010) (No. 10-402), 2010 WL 4232633, at *20
[hereinafter Tuck-It-Away Cert. Petition].
80
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (majority opinion).
81
Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615, 656 (Haw. 2008).
82
Id. (citations omitted).
83
See Tuck-It-Away Cert. Petition, supra note 79, at 20.
84
Cormack v. Settle-Beshears, 474 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2007).
85
W. Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App’x 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2006).
86
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87
Id. at 490-93.
88
Id.
89
See infra Part V.
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MISAPPLYING KELO—A SPLIT IN THE COURTS

While courts uniformly apply Kelo to takings for which
the stated purpose is economic development,90 jurisdictions
differ as to whether the heightened standard for reviewing
pretext claims should be used for other categories of takings,
such as those purportedly executed to eliminate blight.91 Those
courts that afford a deferential presumption of validity to
takings where substantial evidence suggests the stated public
purpose of blight remediation is mere pretext in order to
bestow a private benefit operate against the dictates of Kelo.92
The New York Court of Appeals suffered from this failing when
it improperly upheld the taking in Kaur.93
In cases where the legitimacy of a taking for economic
development is challenged under the Public Use Clause due to
evidence of favoritism, courts uniformly apply Kelo’s standard
for reviewing pretext claims.94 For example, in Western Seafood
Co. v. United States, the Fifth Circuit considered a public use
challenge to a taking that sought to promote economic
development through transfer of Western Seafood’s waterfront
property to Hiram Walker Royall, a private developer.95 There,
the court considered factual evidence of impermissible
favoritism to determine whether the stated public purpose was
merely a pretext for conferring a private benefit.96 This evidence
supported allegations that the private developer had himself
proposed the development project and that the City had granted
him complete operational control over the project.97 However, the
court upheld the taking as constitutional because the evidence
“[did] not support the inference that the City exhibited
favoritism or [had] a purpose other than to promote economic
development.”98 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered
all of the evidence presented by challengers to determine

90

See, e.g., Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Cano Martin Pena v. Fortuno, 604
F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2010); W. Seafood Co., 202 F. App’x at 674.
91
Compare Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008), with
Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171-72 (D.C. 2007).
92
See supra Part II.
93
See infra Part V.
94
See, e.g., Fortuno, 604 F.3d at 23; W. Seafood Co., 202 F. App’x at 674.
95
W. Seafood Co., 202 F. App’x at 671.
96
Id. at 675.
97
Id. at 675 n.9.
98
Id.
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whether a heightened standard of review was necessary and
thus correctly applied the analysis required by Kelo.99
On the other hand, a conflict exists between
jurisdictions as to whether the heightened standard of review
envisioned by Kelo for suspicious takings applies to cases
where the stated public purpose is blight remediation rather
than economic development.100 While the Second Circuit has
expressly limited heightened scrutiny to economic development
takings,101 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has correctly
applied Kelo’s pretext analysis to a taking for blight
remediation.102
The Second Circuit failed to apply Kelo’s heightened
standard of review to a blight remediation taking in
Goldstein.103 There, ESDC took petitioner’s property with the
intention of transferring it to Forest City Ratner Company
(FCRC), a private developer, to develop a new sports stadium
for the New Jersey Nets in the Atlantic Yards Project Area.104 A
blight study commissioned by ESDC found that the
neighborhood was characterized by “unsanitary and
substandard conditions,” such as vacant and underutilized
buildings, irregularly shaped lots, and a long-abandoned and
deteriorating rail line.105 The challenging property owners,
however, claimed the finding of blight was merely pretext for
the private benefit to FCRC.106 The allegations of impermissible
favoritism were supported by evidence that the private
developer first conceived of the project and proposed the
geographic boundaries thereof, that the blight study occurred
after the project had been announced, and that the required
public review was a “sham.”107 Regardless, the court rejected the
public use challenge on its face, finding that the Kelo pretext
analysis did not apply because “private economic development
is neither the sole, nor the primary asserted justification” for
99

Id.; see also City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1137 (Ohio 2006)
(applying Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo to a taking for economic development
purposes to support the proposition that the court should “strike down a taking that, by
a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or
pretextual benefits”).
100
Compare Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008), with Franco v.
Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171-72 (D.C. 2007).
101
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64.
102
Franco, 930 A.2d at 171-72.
103
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64.
104
Id. at 53.
105
Id. at 59.
106
Id. at 52-53.
107
Id. at 55-56.
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the taking.108 The court also refused to apply Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, finding that, “Kennedy may well have intended
[his opinion] to apply exclusively to cases where the sole ground
asserted for the taking was economic development.”109
Conversely, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
applied Kelo in a public use challenge to a taking for blight
remediation.110 In Franco v. National Capital Revitalization
Corp., the court reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss a
claim for impermissible favoritism where a municipal agency
took and transferred land to a private party for the purpose of
developing a purportedly blighted area.111 There, the city alleged
that the challenger’s shopping center was a blighting factor and
thus subject to taking by eminent domain.112 The city based its
finding on evidence that the area was “characterized by
underused, neglected, and poorly maintained properties,” and
that fragmented ownership encouraged an increase in crime,
trash, and “other blighting factors.”113 Further, the city claimed
development by the private recipient would result in crime
reduction, increased sanitation, local job creation, expansion of
the tax base for the city, and the general “revitalization of an
economically distressed community.”114 On the other hand, the
landowner made “specific factual allegations” in support of his
pretext claim, including allegations that the municipal agency
had entered into an agreement with the private developer two
years before the development program was introduced to the
city council, that the agency had “refused to discuss
redevelopment plans with any present owners,” and that the
site was not actually blighted.115
The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for the court below
to try the pretext claim on its merits, finding that “Kelo makes
clear that there is room for a landowner to claim that the
legislature’s declaration of a public purpose is a pretext

108

Id. at 64.
Id. at 64 n.10. Furthermore, as Part IV of this note will explain, the
criteria necessary in New York to take property for either blight remediation or
economic development are indistinguishable from one another. See infra Part IV. Thus,
the distinction is an unsound basis upon which to alter the application of the Public
Use Clause. See infra Part IV.
110
Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171-72 (D.C. 2007).
111
Id. at 162-63.
112
Id. at 163.
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Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 170-71.
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designed to make a taking for private purposes.”116 Unlike the
Second Circuit in Goldstein,117 other courts have correctly
applied the heightened scrutiny required by Kelo.118
Due to the devastating consequences of eminent domain
abuse to vulnerable communities,119 courts should not apply a
uniform standard of absolute deference when deciding whether
the stated purpose of blight remediation is merely pretextual to
bestowing a private benefit.120 The Second Circuit failed to
apply heightened scrutiny in Goldstein and thus violated the
Kelo standard.121 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals
failed to even mention Kelo when it upheld a taking justified by
blight remediation despite well-founded allegations of
impermissible favoritism in Kaur.122 Thus, the court deferred to
ESDC’s finding of blight and, in doing so, upheld a harmful and
unconstitutional taking.
IV.

BLURRING THE LINE: THE EQUIVALENCE OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND BLIGHT REMEDIATION

To justify a taking under the Public Use Clause, the
factors for finding blight in New York are indistinguishable
from those used to determine the need for economic
development.123 Thus, the Second Circuit’s theory that takings
for blight remediation require less judicial scrutiny than those
justified by economic development was illogical.124 The New
York Court of Appeals presumably followed Goldstein as
precedent in Kaur when it improperly deferred to ESDC’s
finding of blight in Manhattanville despite substantial evidence
of impermissible favoritism.125 Therefore, the deferential
standard applied by the court failed to meet the constitutional
116

Id. at 171-72.
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008).
118
See Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615, 650 (Haw. 2008)
(directing the trial court in a public use challenge of a taking allegedly accomplished to
improve a public highway to “consider any and all evidence . . . indicating that the private
benefit . . . predominated”); In re Condemnation Proceeding by the Redevelopment Auth.
of Phila., 938 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. 2007) (considering a pretext claim pursuant to Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo against a taking for blight remediation, and finding that
the record does not support a bad faith claim).
119
See supra Part I.
120
See supra Part II.
121
See supra Part III.
122
See infra Part V.
123
See generally Norman Siegel, Steven Hyman & Philip van Buren, The
Trouble with Eminent Domain in New York, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 77 (2011).
124
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008).
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See infra Part V.
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requirement of judicial review under the Public Use Clause as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kelo.
Courts considered blight removal to be a valid public
purpose for condemnation long before the Supreme Court ruled
that economic development was, additionally, a valid public
purpose.126 The traditional definition of blight, however, was
narrow: it was limited to “slums . . . whose eradication was itself
found to constitute a public purpose for . . . condemnation”
because they created conditions that threatened the health and
welfare of the surrounding community.127 Today, New York’s
criteria for condemnation due to blight include a wide array of
factors, including a simple lack of economic development.128 The
New York State Urban Development Corporation Act (UDC Act)
prescribes that, for a finding of blight, the condemning authority
must determine that “the area in which the project is to be
located is a substandard or insanitary area, or is in danger of
becoming a substandard or insanitary area and tends to impair
or arrest the sound growth and development of the
municipality.”129 Though “insanitary” is a historical criterion for
blight, “substandard” describes a broad range of conditions that
a legislature might find in any area it determines to be in need
of economic development without finding traditional blighting
factors.130 The New York Court of Appeals embraced this broad
definition of blight in Yonkers Community Development Agency
v. Morris, holding that, “areas eligible for . . . renewal are not
limited to ‘slums’ as that term was formerly applied, and that,
among other things, economic underdevelopment and
stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to make
their removal cognizable as a public purpose.”131 This decision
not only established economic development as a legitimate
public purpose in New York; it also expanded the definition of
blight to encompass the need for economic development. Thus,
the line between economic development and blight remediation
was blurred in New York well before Kelo established the
federal baseline for economic development,132 and certainly
before the Second Circuit limited the application of Kelo’s
heightened standard of review to allegations of pretext
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y. 1975).
Id.
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6260(c)(1) (McKinney 2000).
Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 330.
Id. (emphasis added).
Cormack v. Settle-Beshears, 474 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2007).
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concerning takings accomplished solely for economic
development purposes.133
The blurred distinction in New York between blight
remediation and economic development is exemplified by the
cases surrounding the use of eminent domain in Times Square
during the mid 1980s.134 There, courts relied on factors such as
underutilization and suboptimal tax revenues to justify the
elimination of urban blight through eminent domain.135 In
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York, the
Second Circuit upheld a determination of blight based on,
among other factors, the underutilization of property, high
vacancy rates, rundown storefronts, and the presence of
pornographic businesses.136 These conditions, the court held, led
to an “unproductive use of potentially valuable land,” and thus
justified the use of eminent domain.137 In In re G. & A. Books,
Inc., the findings of blight were clearly dependent on
determinations that Times Square was less economically
productive than it could have been with proper
redevelopment.138 This is precisely the justification the City of
New London provided in determining the need to exercise its
power of eminent domain as described in Kelo.139 Thus, courts
should apply the standard developed in Kelo to takings in New
York that claim blight remediation as their public purpose.
As in blight cases, underutilization has also been used
to justify takings solely for economic development in New York,
underscoring the convergence of the two public purposes.140 In
Sunrise Properties v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, the
133

Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008).
See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. New York, 672 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir.
1982); see also In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1985).
135
Id.
136
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 672 F.2d at 294.
137
Id.; see also In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d at 292 (“Only 4,000 people,
an extraordinarily low figure for a five-block area located adjacent to one of the world’s
most densely developed business districts, work in the area. As a result of an absence
of development for more than half a century, the existing buildings are old and run
down; most are substandard for their intended commercial uses and many are vacant
above the first floor. While the area is zoned for the highest density allowed in the City,
16% of the land area is used only for parking, 72% of the development rights have not
been used, and 18% of the developed parts is vacant. The tax yield from the Project
area is commensurately low: the FEIS estimated that while the existing properties in
the Project area were expected to pay approximately $5.4 million in taxes in 1984-85, a
single building a block away was expected to pay $6.2 million in taxes.”).
138
See In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d at 292.
139
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
140
Sunrise Props., Inc. v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d
841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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taking of private land was authorized for job creation,
infrastructure development, and general economic improvement
of the project area.141 In upholding the taking as constitutional,
the court stated, “The finding . . . that the property is
underutilized is equivalent to a determination that
condemnation of the property and subsequent development will
serve a public purpose.”142 Thus, underutilization was used to
justify a taking for economic development just as it was used to
justify takings for blight remediation in Times Square.143
Furthermore, just as creating jobs and increasing tax
revenue were used to justify blight remediation in Times
Square these exact factors are the basis for takings in New
York aimed at promoting economic development. In In re
Fisher, New York City took land in Lower Manhattan for a
private transfer to the New York Stock Exchange without a
finding of blight.144 There, the court upheld the city’s actions
because it found that the taking would spur economic
development through increased job opportunities and tax
revenues.145 Clearly, the line between blight remediation and
economic development in New York is blurred beyond any
substantial distinction. Therefore, challenges to a taking under
the Public Use Clause in New York should receive the same
standard of review regardless of whether the taking is justified
as a means to create economic development or to eliminate
conditions that cause blight.
Though Kelo requires an inquiry into takings where the
stated public purpose is mere pretext for bestowing a private
benefit,146 New York courts apply an absolutely deferential
standard to a legislative or administrative decision to take land
for blight remediation:
It is only where there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion
as to whether an area is blighted, that judges may substitute their
views as to the adequacy with which the public purpose of blight
removal has been made out for those of the legislatively designated
agencies; where . . . “those bodies have made their finding, not
corruptly or irrationally or baselessly, there is nothing for the courts

141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d at 292.
See In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d 516, 516-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
Id. at 517.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
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to do about it, unless every act and decision of other departments of
government is subject to revision by the courts.”147

This deferential treatment is not appropriate for cases in
which challengers allege impermissible favoritism in violation of
the Public Use Clause and support such allegations with
substantial evidence.148 Thus, the standard applied by New York
courts is below the federal baseline established in Kelo and
enables legislatures to abuse their power of eminent domain.149
New York is one of only eleven states that permit
takings for solely economic development purposes.150 Thus, a
147

In re Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y.
2009) (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1953)).
148
See supra Part II.
149
See supra Part II.
150
The following research was conducted by Justin Kamen, Whitney Philips,
and Ellie Merle, under the direction of Norman Siegel, Esq., from June-August, 2010.
The following eleven states allow eminent domain takings for the sole purpose of
economic development:
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-168-304, 14-169-802(a)(1)(A) (2010). Hawaii: HAW.
REV. STAT. § 101-2 (2010). Illinois: 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c), 620/9 (2011); see
Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 167 (Ill. 2003); Sw. Ill. Dev.
Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 13-14 (Ill. 2002). Kansas: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 26-501b (2009). Maryland: See Mayor of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d
324, 353 (Md. 2007). Massachusetts: See Commonwealth v. Bos. Edison Co., 828 N.E.2d
16, 30 (Mass. 2005). Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-27-1 (2010); see Phil West,
Mississippi Senate Upholds Barbour Veto of Eminent Domain Bill, COM. APPEAL (Mar.
26, 2009, 1:54 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2009/mar/26/mississippisenate-upholds-barbour-veto-eminent-do/. New York: See In re Glen Cove Cmty. Dev.
Agency, 712 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Sunrise Props. v. Jamestown
Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Rhode Island:
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64.12-8 (2011). South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-8-50
(2010). Utah: See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-2(e)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011).
The following thirty-nine states do not allow eminent domain takings for
the sole purpose of economic development:
Alabama: See ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2 (2010). Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(d) (2010).
Arizona: A.Z. CONST. art. II, § 17; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12-1111 (2010).
California: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (West 2010); Redevelopment Agency
of S.F. v. Hayes, 206 P.2d 105, 121 (Ca. Ct. Apps. 1954). Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-1-101(b)(I) (2010). Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-127a(1) (2010). Delaware:
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 9501A(a) (2010); Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land With
Improvements, 1986 De. Super. LEXIS 1348 (Del. Sup. Ct. Aug. 11, 1986). Florida:
FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2010). Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(9)(B) (2011). Idaho: IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(b) (2010). Indiana: IND. CODE §§ 32-24-4.5-1(a), 36-7-14-20, 367-14-43(7) (2010); Hawkins v. Greenfield, 230 N.E.2d 396, 403 (Ind. 1967). Iowa: IOWA
CODE § 6A.22(2) (2010). Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (West 2010).
Louisiana: L.A. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(3). Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 816 (2010).
Michigan: M.I. CONST. art. X § 2 (2010). Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 117.025(11)(b)
(2010). Missouri: MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271 (West 2010). Montana: See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-30-102 (2010). Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710.04(1) (2010). Nevada: See
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.010 (2010). New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498A:2(VII)(b) (2010). New Jersey: See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § III, ¶ 1; Gallenthin Realty
Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 449 (N.J. 2007). New Mexico: N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-10(L)(3) (2010). North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-512(6)
(2010). North Dakota: N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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condemning authority can claim blight remediation, rather than
economic development, as its purpose for taking property so as
to avoid close judicial review of its motives.151 In states that do
not permit eminent domain solely for economic development
purposes, courts review evidence to ensure that condemnors do
not manufacture blight findings in attempts to conceal a true
purpose of strictly economic development.152 For example, in City
of Norwood v. Horney, the Supreme Court of Ohio struck down
the use of eminent domain where the condemning authority
sought to take property in what it deemed to be a “deteriorating
area.”153 There, the court found the taking illegal because the
factors used to determine whether an area was deteriorating,
including increased traffic, numerous curb cuts, and small front
yards, created “a standardless standard,” by which a
condemning agency could describe practically any city.154
Therefore, the taking was founded solely on the promotion of
economic development and, thus, did not have a sufficient public
purpose under the Ohio Constitution.155 However, in New York,
no such scrutiny is applied to blight takings because economic
development is a sufficient public purpose in and of itself for the
use of eminent domain.156 Also, the criteria used in New York to
justify takings for both blight elimination and for economic
development are nearly identical, rendering the line between
these two public purposes blurred beyond substantive
recognition.157 Thus, it is vitally important that New York courts
apply the federal baseline established in Kelo to blightremediating takings.158 Otherwise, legislatures can circumvent
§ 163.01(H)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). Oklahoma: Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d
639, 647 (Okla. 2006). Oregon: See OR. REV. STAT. § 35.015 (2009). Pennsylvania: See
26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204 (2010). South Carolina: S.C. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 13.
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (West 2010). Texas: TX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 2206.001 (b)(3) (West 2010). Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040(a) (2010); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3201(17)-(19) (2010). Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2010).
Washington: See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.81.080 (West 2010). West Virginia: See
W. VA. CODE § 54-1-2 (2010). Wisconsin: See WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6)(c) (2010). Wyoming:
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801(c) (2010).
151
See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008).
152
See, e.g., City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006).
153
Id. at 1145.
154
Id. at 1144-45.
155
Id. at 1142.
156
See In re Glen Cove Cmty. Dev. Agency, 712 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999); Sunrise Props., Inc. v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d
841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
157
Compare Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 726 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010),
with Sunrise Props., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
158
See supra Part II.
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Kelo’s ban on takings for impermissible private purposes by
claiming a purpose of blight remediation rather than economic
development, as was the case in Kaur.159
With the Second Circuit’s refusal to extend Kelo’s
pretext analysis to takings for blight remediation in
Goldstein,160 condemning authorities in New York can avoid a
heightened standard of review for takings that exhibit evidence
of impermissible favoritism161 by simply claiming blight
remediation as the purpose for a taking rather than economic
development. Thus, such an authority can bypass judicial
scrutiny and bestow a private benefit through eminent domain
by simply manufacturing a blight study.162 This was the case in
Kaur, where the finding of blight in Manhattanville was
supported by the desire to create jobs, increase tax revenue,163
and prevent underutilization of property.164 In this way, the
public purpose of blight remediation stated in Kaur is very
similar to the public purpose of economic development used
elsewhere in the State.165 As such, judicial review of purpose in
eminent domain takings should be equivalent in these
instances. Because the New York Court of Appeals applied a
deferential standard in Kaur and declined to apply the
heightened scrutiny demanded by Kelo,166 the Supreme Court
should have remanded the case back to the New York Court of
Appeals for argument on the merits as to the claims of
impermissible favoritism.167 Instead, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and tacitly condoned the erroneous deference applied
by the New York Court of Appeals to ESDC’s exercise of
eminent domain for the sole benefit of Columbia University.168
V.

KAUR V. NEW YORK STATE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION: AN UNCHECKED ABUSE OF POWER

In Kaur, the New York Court of Appeals declined to
address the mere pretext analysis demanded by Kelo despite
159

See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724.
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008).
See supra Part II.
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See supra Part II.
163
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729.
164
Id. at 726.
165
In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d 516, 516-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Sunrise Props.,
Inc. v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
166
See supra Part II.
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See infra Part V.
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Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822, 822-23 (2010).
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well-founded allegations that the taking was motivated by a
private purpose.169 There, ESDC purportedly sought to
remediate blight in Manhattanville, a neighborhood on the
Upper West Side of Manhattan, by transferring property to
Columbia University.170 Because the challengers in Kaur
presented a “plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism
to private parties,”171 the court should have applied heightened
scrutiny rather than the standard deference afforded to
legislatures in typical public use challenges. Moreover, the
evidence of impermissible favoritism in Kaur was nearly
identical to the hypothetical factors outlined in Justice
Kennedy’s Kelo concurrence, which would be subject to
heightened scrutiny.172 Finally, the procedures in New York for
effecting a condemnation of property are particularly prone to
abuse and thus challenges to such takings should receive
proper consideration by the judiciary.173 Thus, the New York
Court of Appeals should have applied a heightened standard of
review in Kaur due to evidence strongly suggesting that the
taking, purportedly justified by blight remediation, was
actually intended to bestow a purely private benefit.174 Because
the courts have failed to prevent eminent domain abuse in New
York, the legislature should take steps to reduce the instances
and inequalities of takings that have private beneficiaries.
A.

Evidence of Impermissible Favoritism in Kaur

The facts of Kaur were strikingly similar to those described
as highly suspect by Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical example of an
impermissible taking in his Kelo concurrence, and thus the case
demanded heightened judicial scrutiny.175 Unlike in Kelo, where
the private beneficiary was unknown at the time the
Columbia’s
attorneys,
redevelopment
plan
originated,176
consultants, and architects drafted every document concerning the
Manhattanville redevelopment plan.177 Additionally, numerous
actions taken by both ESDC and Columbia throughout the
169

See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 732.
In re Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2009), rev’d 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).
171
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
172
Id. at 493.
173
See infra Part V.B.
174
See In re Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
175
See supra Part II.
176
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177
In re Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
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condemnation process suggest the kind of conspiratorial
relationship envisioned by the Supreme Court in Kelo to constitute
impermissible favoritism.178 Such evidence includes Columbia’s
misdeeds as the dominant property owner in Manhattanville,179
ESDC’s reliance on blight studies performed by Columbia’s
advisor,180 and ESDC’s attempts to obfuscate the record by
withholding important documents during the litigation process.181
Perhaps the most striking evidence of eminent domain
abuse in Kaur was Columbia’s own role in creating the factors
that ultimately led to ESDC’s determination of blight in the
area, such as underutilization of property and the existence of
building code violations.182 When ESDC considered developing
the area in 2002, its Master Plan described no blight or
blighted conditions in Manhattanville.183 No blight studies were
conducted thereafter until 2006, when Columbia had already
taken control of “the very properties that would form the basis
for a subsequent blight study.”184 As owner of these properties,
Columbia vacated much of the real estate by forcing more than
50 percent of the tenants out of seventeen buildings.185
Additionally, Columbia facilitated the degeneration of the
neighborhood by failing to address water infiltration and
building code violations, allowing tenants to violate local codes
and ordinances, and maintaining garbage and debris in its
properties for several years.186 Further, the Appellate Division
found that Manhattanville “was not in a depressed economic
condition when . . . ESDC embarked on their Columbiaprepared-and-financed quest.”187 As such, the taking in Kaur
provided substantial evidence of impermissible favoritism.
Columbia’s creation of blighting factors distinguishes
Kaur from Western Seafood, where a private developer received
taken land in an economically stagnant community to spur
development.188 In that case, the Fifth Circuit applied Kelo’s test
for mere pretext because the private developer had a suspicious

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 29 (Richter, J., concurring).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
W. Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App’x 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2006).
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amount of control over the project.189 However, the court
allowed the taking: “because the [private developer] own[ed]
acres of property along the river where the marina [was] to be
built, the City’s interest in their collaboration [was] logical.”190
While this situation is similar to the facts of Kaur, Western
Seafood shows no evidence that the private developer caused
the very blighting factors that supplied the need for a taking.191
In Kaur, on the other hand, the city rewarded Columbia for
causing blight by giving the irresponsible property owner even
more land.192 Therefore, heightened scrutiny was appropriate in
Kaur but not in Western Seafood.
ESDC’s complicity with Columbia’s efforts to justify the
use of eminent domain in Manhattanville provides further
evidence of impermissible favoritism.193 In 2006, ESDC hired
private consultant Allee King Rosen and Flemming, Inc.
(AKRF) to conduct a blight study of Manhattanville.194AKRF’s
finding of blight was tainted, however, by its previous role in
assisting Columbia to develop and execute an expansion plan
in 2004.195 When the challenging property owners issued a
Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request for documents
concerning the relationship between AKRF, ESDC, and
Columbia, the court forced ESDC to disclose the documents
because “the difficulty of offering perfectly objective advice
while serving two masters elevate[d the] FOIL appeal beyond
the average agency-consultant relationship that the FOIL
exemptions are designed to foster and protect.”196 By employing
Columbia’s consultant for its initial blight study, ESDC clearly
favored Columbia in the process of determining the need for
exercising eminent domain in Manhattanville.197 Though ESDC
subsequently replaced AKRF with Earth Tech, a consultant
without suspicious ties to Columbia, ESDC requested that
Earth Tech “‘replicate’ the AKRF study using the same flawed
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Id.
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See id.
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In re Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22; see also Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
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Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
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methodology” previously employed by AKRF.198 Thus, ESDC’s
final blight study was just as tarnished by favoritism to
Columbia as the original AKRF study had been.199 Additionally,
Earth Tech’s study was not completed until 2008, at which
point “the ESDC/Columbia steamroller had virtually run its
course to the fullest.”200 This is exactly the kind of public-private
conspiracy Justice Kennedy envisioned in Kelo to demand
heightened scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.201
One of the documents unveiled by the aforementioned
FOIL litigation reveals the dramatic extent of ESDC’s role in
creating a pretextual justification for the exercise of eminent
domain on Columbia’s behalf.202 In an e-mail sent before hiring
AKRF in 2006, ESDC Senior Counsel Joseph Petillo questioned
the wisdom of conducting a blight study: “I am uncomfortable
with [ESDC] shining a spotlight on the process used to
manufacture support for condemnation . . . . [M]aybe we want
to craft the support for our blight findings in a less public
way . . . .”203 This e-mail was clearly evidence of unconstitutional
collusion, as ESDC intended to “manufacture” support for the
taking to benefit Columbia. Furthermore, ESDC not only
withheld this and similar documents from challenging property
owners despite numerous FOIL requests and litigations, but it
also refused to keep the record open until the FOIL litigation
initiated by the landowners was completed.204 As such, ESDC
exhibited impermissible favoritism toward Columbia from the
planning phase through the entire litigation process.205
The Appellate Division, which first heard Kaur,
concluded from this evidence that ESDC used its blight finding
as pretext to bestowing a benefit on Columbia and, as per the
Supreme Court’s instructions in Kelo, held that ESDC did not
take the private property for a legitimate public purpose.206
When the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division’s decision, the court failed to even mention Kelo, let
alone apply Kennedy’s test for heightened scrutiny.207 Thus, the
198
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201
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Court of Appeals misapplied the Kelo standard where it was
clearly applicable and therefore decided Kaur incorrectly.
While the Second Circuit and the New York Court of
Appeals also declined to apply a heightened standard of review
in the Goldstein cases,208 the facts of the Atlantic Yards taking
were more closely aligned with the facts of Kelo than with
Kennedy’s hypothetical, and thus, unlike in Kaur, the courts
were justified when they dismissed the public use challenges.209
When ESDC decided to improve the Atlantic Yards Project
Area through private development by the FCRC, the finding of
blight was supported by over forty years of previous studies
that had reached similar conclusions.210 Particularly, the blight
studies determined the need to eliminate a large abandoned
railway that was the main factor in the area’s economic
deterioration.211 This supported ESDC’s decision to condemn
property for transfer to FCRC on the basis that the area was,
in fact, blighted.212 As blight remediation is a legitimate public
purpose for the exercise of eminent domain, the courts were
correct to uphold the taking of land in Atlantic Yards despite
their failure to properly apply Kelo.213 Such evidence was not
present in Kaur, however,214 and thus that case was erroneously
decided under an overly deferential standard of review.
B.

Procedural Impediments to Public Use Challenges in
New York

The New York Court of Appeals should have applied
heightened scrutiny in Kaur not only because factual evidence
strongly suggested impermissible favoritism, but also because,
under New York law, the challengers were unable to seek
review at a trial level court.215 Instead, they were required to
begin the litigation process at the appellate level after
establishing the record at a public hearing conducted by
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ESDC.216 In Kelo, Justice Kennedy’s call for heightened scrutiny
in some public use challenges included cases where “the
procedures employed [are] prone to abuse . . . .”217 Kennedy
found a seven-day bench trial before the Superior Court to be
an adequate procedural safeguard because property owners
could challenge the legitimacy of the taking in a fair,
adversarial proceeding.218 On the other hand, New York is
currently the only state in which challenges to the legitimacy of
an alleged public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain do
not receive judicial review at the trial court level.219 Thus, the
216
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Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
218
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219
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COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.25 (2012). Minnesota: See MINN. STAT. § 117.075 (2010).
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See Groundwater v. Wright, 588 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Mont. 1979). Nebraska: See City of
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STAT. ANN. § 37.060 (2010); see Glenbrook Homeowners Ass’n v. Pettitt, 919 P.2d 1061,
1062 (Nev. 1996). New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:9-b (2010). New Jersey:
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:3-2(e), 20:3-5 (2010). New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-1-21
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New York Court of Appeals should have applied more exacting
scrutiny in Kaur due to suboptimal procedural protections
against the exercise of eminent domain for an illegitimate
private purpose.220
Under New York’s Eminent Domain Procedural Law
(EDPL), a condemning authority is required to make a
“determination and findings concerning the proposed public
project,” in which it must specify “the public use, benefit or
purpose to be served by the proposed public project.”221 Prior to
its decision to take property, the condemnor must hold a public
hearing222 where “any person . . . shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to present [a] . . . statement . . . concerning the
proposed public project. A record of the hearing shall be
kept . . . .”223 Any party wishing to challenge a decision to
condemn property “may seek judicial review thereof by the
appellate division of the supreme court . . . . The court shall
either confirm or reject the condemnor’s determination and
findings. The scope of review shall be limited to whether . . . a
public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed
acquisition.”224 In Jackson v. New York State Urban
Development Corp., the New York Court of Appeals found that
the EDPL does not “[require] a trial-type hearing to challenge a
tentative decision to condemn.”225 Therefore, a property owner
who wishes to challenge the legitimacy of a taking under the
Public Use Clause does not have the opportunity to present
evidence to a neutral decision maker in a trial court for
preservation of a record.226 Rather, such property owner must
first present evidence at a public hearing conducted by the
Island: See R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., L.P., 892 A.2d 87, 91 (R.I. 2006). South
Carolina: See Brown v. Aiken Cnty., 244 S.E.2d 514, 515 (S.C. 1978) (reviewing the trial
court’s decision to uphold the condemnation of property owners’ land). South Dakota: S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-35-10.1 (2010). Tennessee: Ryan v. Louisville & N. Terminal Co., 50
S.W. 744, 746 (Tenn. 1899). Texas: TX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.003 (2010). Utah: See Salt
Lake Cnty. v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182, 183-84 (Utah 1977). Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, §§ 504, 505 (2010). Virginia: See Hoffman Family, LLC v. City of Alexandria, 634
S.E.2d 722, 725 (Va. 2006). Washington: See King Cnty. v. Theilman, 369 P.2d 503, 503
(Wash. 1962). West Virginia: See Charleston Natural Gas Co. v. Lowe & Butler, 44 S.E.
410 (W. Va. 1901) (reversing the Circuit Court’s decision and allowing a gas company to
condemn land for use of its pipeline). Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 32.06(7) (2010). Wyoming:
See Conner v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Natrona Cnty., 54 P.3d 1274, 1278 (Wyo. 2002).
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condemning authority.227 The record that would normally be
established in a trial court before a judge228 is thus developed
under the guidance of the agency seeking to exercise eminent
domain. When the property owner challenges the agency’s
decision to condemn, the appellate court hears evidence
developed at such hearing.229 This system creates procedural
impediments to challenge the stated public purpose for a
taking and is thus prone to abuse by condemning authorities.230
The procedures outlined in the EDPL have been upheld
as constitutional in New York and thus do not, on their own,
violate a challenger’s due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment.231 The Fifth Amendment mandates that the
government shall not deprive citizens of property without due
process,232 the adequacy of which is determined by considering
the private interest at risk of deprivation by the procedure, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the
government’s interest in implementing the procedure.233 The
Second Circuit ruled in Brody v. Village of Port Chester that
the challenger of a taking “has no constitutional right to
participate in the [agency’s] initial decision to exercise its
power of eminent domain, and the post determination review
procedure set forth in EDPL § 207 is sufficient” to provide
challengers adequate process.234 Because challengers can raise
their claims at the public hearing required under the EDPL,
they have an opportunity to make a record by presenting their
views and submitting evidence.235 As such, the procedure here
described is not itself a violation of the due process right “to be
heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”236
However, Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical in Kelo does not
require a violation of due process to trigger heightened scrutiny
when there are allegations that the stated public purpose for a
227
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taking is mere pretext to bestow a private benefit.237 Rather, his
standards for denying a presumption of validity require only that
“the procedures employed [are] prone to abuse . . . .”238 Though a
public hearing allows challengers to establish a record that can
later be heard by an appellate court, there are “practical
impediments” inherent in this non-adversarial forum to
demonstrating impermissible favoritism.239 For example, in Kaur,
ESDC closed the record despite the fact that the challenging
landowners were engaged in FOIL litigation to retrieve
documents from ESDC in support of their public use challenge.240
Had the record been established under the supervision of a
neutral arbiter rather than by the condemning authority itself,
the plaintiffs in Kaur may have been able to use these documents
to state a more compelling case of impermissible favoritism.241
Although the EDPL does not facially violate the Due Process
Clause, it sufficiently burdens challengers to trigger heightened
judicial review under Kennedy’s analysis for mere pretext.242
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals should have applied a
heightened standard of review in Kaur.
C.

Possible Legislative Solutions to Eminent Domain in
New York

If the New York courts continue to allow takings for
unconstitutional private purposes, then the New York State
Legislature must take steps to prevent the abuses that occurred
in Kaur from recurring in the future. Most obviously, New York
should join the other forty-nine states in requiring trial level
review of eminent domain challenges under the Public Use
Clause243 to ensure procedures that are not “prone to abuse.”244 Also,
if the courts insist on maintaining different standards of review,
the application of which depend on whether a taking is intended to
eliminate blight or solely to promote economic development,245 then
the statutory scheme must redefine blight so as to avoid the
237
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manipulations devised by ESDC and Columbia to elude
heightened judicial scrutiny.246 Thus, New York should amend the
UDC Act to construe “blighted area” narrowly. Specifically, the
legislature should adopt Vermont’s statutory limitation that “[n]o
area shall be determined to be a blighted area solely or primarily
because its condition and value for tax purposes are less than the
condition and value projected as the result of the implementation
of any . . . private redevelopment plan.”247 Finally, New York
should reduce the hardships imposed on persons displaced and
disinherited by takings that seek solely to promote economic
development by providing increased compensation for the
property taken.248 The legislature should adopt Kansas’s approach,
which requires the condemnor in an economic development taking
to pay the landowner 150 percent of the subject property’s fair
market value.249 By adopting these new laws, the New York State
Legislature can reduce the instances and inequalities of eminent
domain abuse despite the courts’ unwillingness to oppose private
development interests and their political enablers.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have reversed the New York
Court of Appeals in Kaur and remanded the case for review
using the heightened scrutiny required by Kelo. Such a decision
would have both defended the vulnerable populations harmed
by the taking itself250 and settled the jurisdictional split
regarding public use challenges to takings that are purportedly
intended to remediate blight.251 Instead, the Second Circuit and
New York courts will continue to defer to the judgments of
condemning authorities that seek to abuse their power of
eminent domain and who, in doing so, contribute to the
widening gap between rich and poor throughout the state.252
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The Supreme Court may have denied certiorari in Kaur253
because the New York Court of Appeals held that, besides
eliminating blight, the expansion of Columbia University’s
campus in Manhattanville would serve a public purpose in and of
itself as a “civic project.”254 Under the UDC Act, ESDC is
empowered to take land, not only to remediate blight,255 but also to
“undertake the acquisition . . . of a [civic] project [when] . . . there
exists . . . a need for the educational . . . facility . . . [and that] the
project shall consist of . . . facilities which are suitable for
educational . . . purposes.”256 Thus, the Supreme Court may have
declined to discuss the suspicious facts surrounding ESDC’s
finding of blight in Kaur due to an unwillingness to prevent the
use of eminent domain in support of an important and beneficial
educational institution.257 If so, the Court should take the next
available opportunity to address the improper judicial deference
expressed in Goldstein and displayed in Kaur in order to prevent
the New York courts from further abdicating their duties as
defenders of individual rights against the excesses of
governmental power.258 However, if the New York courts
continue to sanction eminent domain abuse despite the dictates
of Kelo, the legislature must take action to protect vulnerable
populations from takings that only benefit private parties.
Justin B. Kamen
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